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Abstract
A number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that the recent revival of
interest in panpsychism within philosophy of mind could reinvigorate a pantheistic
philosophy of religion. This project explores whether the combination and individua-
tion problems, which have dominated recent scholarship within panpsychism, can aid
the pantheist’s articulation of a God/universe unity. Constitutive holistic panpsychism is
seen to be the only type of panpsychism suited to aid pantheism in articulating this type
of unity. There are currently no well-developed solutions to the individuation problem
for this type of panpsychism. Moreover, the gestures towards a solution appear costly to
the religious significance of pantheism. This article concludes that any hope that
contemporary panpsychism might aid pantheists in articulating unity is premature
and possibly misplaced.
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Introduction
For better or worse, philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion have a porous
relationship. This paper evaluates whether recent scholarship on panpsychism’s
combination/individuation problem within philosophy of mind can be adapted to
provide the articulation of unity, both within the world and between the universe and
God, required for a philosophical articulation of pantheism.1
Panpsychism and pantheism have often appeared as complimentary positions within
the history of philosophy (see James 1909/2008), and so, it is unsurprising that there
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has been some expectation that the growing resurgence of interest in panpsychism over
the last 30 years might reignite philosophical interest in pantheism. Panpsychists
sometimes trace their lineage back to Thales’ reported statement, ‘all things are full
of gods’ (Aristotle 2007: 411a7). The term ‘panpsychia’ was coined by Francesco
Patrizi in the sixteenth century to refer to the phenomenal nature of the divine
omnipresence, which links panpsychism and divine immanence (Nagasawa
forthcoming). However, unlike many of their historical forebears, most contemporary
panpsychists construe panpsychism in a purely naturalistic fashion. That is, the
explicandum for panpsychists is not God or any religious unity, but (primarily) the
human mind and subjective awareness. Yet, if mentality is in some way considered akin
to divinity, then it is easy to suppose, prima facie, that the fundamental and often
ubiquitous position of mind within panpsychism is complimentary to pantheism.2 John
Macquarrie exhibits this thinking when he writes that, ‘But God would be present to
some degree in everything, so that pantheism often combines with a doctrine of
panpsychism’ (Macquarrie 1984: 53). However, the intuition that panpsychism and
pantheism might be counterpart theories in mind and religion needs careful
examination.
It is for this reason that leading contemporary pantheist, Michael Levine, writes that
neither pantheism nor panpsychism ‘entail one another, and the suggestion that pan-
theism and panpsychism naturally go together is vague apart from specific accounts of
the two positions’ (Levine 1994: 114). Levine draws a clear distinction between
panpsychism and pantheism so that the core claims of both theses extend far outside
the purview of the other. In brief, panpsychism makes no direct claim on religious
views and pantheism (in Levine’s hands) makes no claims on the origin or place of
consciousness. Panpsychism and pantheism can certainly be held independently of one
another. However, the question of whether panpsychism can aid pantheism in articu-
lating a religiously significant model of unity within the universe is not discussed by
Levine. This paper addresses this lacuna, not by evaluating the relationship between
panpsychism and pantheism through the vague notion that if mind is ubiquitous then
God must be also, as Levine rightly critiques, but instead focuses on the structural
correspondence between the problems of mental combination and divine-world unity
within each philosophy.
The first argument within this paper (Section 1: Pantheism and the Importance of
Unity and Section 2: Types of Panpsychism Relevant to Pantheism) is to show that the
pantheist’s problem of unity and the panpsychist’s problems of combination are parallel
problems. First, it is shown that pantheism, to become a successful and popular position
within contemporary philosophy of religion, urgently requires a clear and distinctive
articulation of unity. It is argued that in order to demarcate pantheism from
neighbouring theological positions, the pantheist needs to articulate a constitutive unity
with regard to both the universe taken as a single whole and to the God-world
relationship. Second, this paper argues that the type of panpsychism that is most likely
to aid the pantheist, in that it requires the same expression of unity as pantheism, is
constitutive holistic panpsychism. The third section moves on to the second main
2 Yujin Nagasawa argues that, if mentality is akin to divinity, then the more precise correspondence is between
pantheism and cosmopsychism, whereas panpsychism corresponds to (an extreme form of) polytheism
(Nagasawa forthcoming).
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argument of this paper; constitutive holistic panpsychism currently offers no successful
solutions to the unity problem that it shares with pantheism. To argue this, I evaluate four
contemporary models of constitutive holistic panpsychism in reference to pantheism. It
is seen that these panpsychist solutions are either inconsistent, underdeveloped, or come
at a significant religious cost to the pantheist. Overall, this paper argues that very few
versions of panpsychism are suited to aiding pantheists articulate unity, and the one
version that is suited is currently unable to do so. As such, the revival in panpsychism
currently offers much less hope for reigniting pantheism than might be imagined. It may
be that contemporary panpsychism holds more compatibility with non-pantheistic
philosophies of religion such as classical theism (as Leibniz argued) or panentheism
(as Hartshorne argued). Indeed, Freya Mathews has suggested that panentheism may
simply be the religious equivalent of panpsychism (Mathews 2010). It is beyond the
scope of this paper, which focuses on panpsychism’s relationship to pantheism, to
evaluate this possibility, but it remains an important area for future research.
Section 1: Pantheism and the Importance of Unity
Pantheism stands at one end of a spectrum of views regarding the ‘God-world’ rela-
tionship. As is implied in the name, pantheism is broadly the view that everything (pan)
is God (theism). This definition sounds simple enough, but, of course, much depends on
how ‘everything’, ‘God’ and perhaps most importantly ‘is’ are more precisely defined.
What ontological categories are included in everything and whether God is perceived as
a personal or impersonal category, dictate what resources a pantheist has in when parsing
out the unity between all things, which is the core of the pantheistic thesis.
Pantheism, in fact, asserts two relations of identity. First, God is identified with the
universe (or vice versa), and second, all things within the universe are identified into a
single unity. Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of pantheism captures this well. He writes,
‘Pantheism essentially involves two assertions: that everything that exists constitutes a
unity and that this all-inclusive unity is divine.’ (MacIntyre 1967: 34)3 Following
MacIntyre’s definition, leading contemporary pantheist scholar Michael Levine speaks
of ‘an all-inclusive divine unity’ (Levine 1994: 2). The pantheist, firstly, requires unity
within the world so that God/universe can be understood as one single deity,
distinguishing pantheism from polytheism. Secondly, the unity between God and world
must be able to differentiate pantheism from other forms of theism which also
emphasize a divine immanence.4
Douglas Hedley has argued (contra Michael Levine) that whereas Spinoza can be
considered a pantheist because he posits ‘a constitutive unity (because one substance
3 Paul Harrison writes, ‘Two core beliefs lie at the heart of pantheism. All pantheists believe that the universe
is divine, or that there is no distinction or separation between the universe and God. And they believe that the
universe is in the deepest sense a unified whole of which all individual things are interdependent parts’
(Harrison 1999: 1, 39). Graham Oppy also provides the two-part definition, ‘1. There is a unique thing of
which all things are parts. … 2. The thing of which all things are parts is divine’ (Oppy 1997: 320).
4 As Douglas Hedley has argued, too long have theists and pantheists only dealt with Bcrude^ version of their
opponents positions, ‘The real debate is between subtle pantheism (SP) which proposes a unifying immanent
force worth of worship and subtle theism (ST) which proposes a causal relationship between a transcendent
unity and the cosmos’ (Hedley 1996: 62).
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has modes and attributes)’, the Neoplatonists could not be considered pantheists
because they believed in ‘a causal relationship between the One and the Many’, which
is a non-constitutive unity (Hedley 1996: 65–66, italics added). My concern here is not,
as it is for Hedley, with characterizing who was or was not a pantheist or theist
historically. Instead, what I take from Hedley is the need for a more nuanced, perhaps
less polemic, understanding of both theism and pantheism in the comparative literature
on these two positions. Theism should not be mischaracterised as a position lacking in
all types of unity in the God-world relationship and pantheism should not be seen to
posit unity of an unspecified nature. Instead, pantheism and theism are genuine
religious alternatives because they uphold different types of unity between God and
the world, constitutive unity and non-constitutive (or causal) unity, respectively.
Constitutive unity here refers a type of unity between levels or phenomena, whereby
if x is in constitutive unity with y, then all the true statements about y are true because
they are true about x. Constitutive unity is sometimes seen as a reductive relation, in
that the unity between levels does not permit new properties at the higher-level that are
not constituted by the properties at the lower level. By contrast, x is unified with y in a
non-constitutive relation if x is more than y in some way, there are some independent
truths about x. For a non-constitutive relation, there could be truths about x which
cannot be said to be true of y or are not true about x because of its unity with y (even if
they are true about x and y separately). If a pantheist posits a non-constitutive unity
between God and the world, then they would open a descriptive and causal gap
between God and the world, thus failing to demarcate their position from alternative
positions. What I am suggesting here is that the type of unity between God and the
universe necessary for demarcating pantheism from other neighbouring theological
positions is specifically constitutive unity; all statements which are true about God are
also true about the universe (when taken as a single whole), and it is because they are
true about the universe that they are also true about God and vice versa.
Two common ways to posit unity within the universe are through either a materialist
or idealist monism. Materialistic pantheism (sometimes called ‘scientific pantheism’ or
‘naturalistic pantheism’) has long been charged with atheism.5 By defining everything
as exclusively material, or as exclusively knowable to the natural sciences,
materialistic/scientific pantheism is in danger of reducing divinity to a sentimental
gloss which humans attach to an otherwise mechanistic and mindless universe.6 Hence,
Schopenhauer’s famous objection to pantheism ‘is that it says nothing. To call the
world God is not to explain it; it is only to enrich our language with a superfluous
synonym for the word Bworld^’ (Schopenhauer 1951: 40). The implication is that if
God is to be a religiously significant term or if pantheism is to have semantic content
beyond atheism, then it cannot be merely a collective term for all the (purely) physical
objects in the universe.
5 Coleridge, in his non-pantheistic phrase, claimed that ‘everything God, and no God, are identical positions’
(McFarland 1969: 228). H.P. Owen (1971: 69–70) says, ‘if BGod^ (theos) is identical with the universe (to
pan) it is merely another name for the Universe’. Richard Dawkin’s writes that ‘Pantheism is sexed up
atheism’ (Dawkins 2006: 40).
6 Illingworth famously accused pantheism of being ‘materialism grown sentimental’ (Illingworth 1898: 69),
and Henri Bergson writes that the result is to ‘hypostatize the unity of nature, or, what comes to the same thing,
the unity of science, in a being who is nothing because he does nothing, an ineffectual God who simply sums
up in himself all the given’ (Urquhart 1919: 207, 614).
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Idealistic pantheism, by contrast, has been critiqued for implying that the material
universe and all which we perceive is an illusion or shadow of the Infinite Being.
Idealistic pantheism has been a leading theory throughout the long history of Indian
philosophy. In the Rig-Veda (x.90) we read the pantheistic statement, ‘He [Brahman] is
Himself the very universe. He is whatever is, has been, and shall be’ (Urquhart 1919:
58). Early twentieth century commentators identify two movements within the panthe-
ism of the Upanishads: the denial of the particularity of our ordinary experience so that
there are no discrete objects and an absolute identity between the individual subject
(Atman, the soul and no-self) and the divine Brahama, ‘so as to reach an absolute
unity’, a single self (Ibid: 109–118). The goal is ‘the fontal unity of undifferentiated
being’ (Ibid: 111). The individual Atman is not a small part of the divine being but is
wholly and fully the divine being, since they are identified as one and the same. This is
the discovery that one’s own self and existence as an individual, discrete entity is an
illusion; I do not really exist, or not in a differentiated sense. The conclusion that all
material existence and mental particularity does not exist is at best experientially
unsatisfactory and at worst self-refuting (Descartes was at least correct about that).
Pantheism requires an account of constitutive unity which can hold together the reality
of particular individual subjects and a concept of a single universal whole.
Section 2: Types of Panpsychism Relevant to Pantheism
The ancient theory of consciousness, panpsychism, is undergoing something of a
revival within philosophy of mind. Arguments put forward by renowned figures such
as Thomas Nagel, Galen Strawson and David J. Chalmers are being joined by an
increasing number of established philosophers defending the claim that panpsychism is
currently the most cogent way to understand human consciousness and its place in an
evolutionary world.
Panpsychism refers to a diverse range of theories all united by the broad idea that
‘mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe’
(Seager and Allen-Hermanson 2010).7 There are three main questions panpsychists
must answer in constructing a specific type of panpsychism. (a) How (or where) is it
best to articulate fundamentality? Here the choice is between atomistic and holistic
forms of panpsychism. (b) What type of mentality is necessary referring to the
fundamental level of reality? Here the choice is between (subject) panpsychism and
panprotopsychism. (c) What is the relationship between human minds (macro-level
minds) and fundamental mind(s)? Here the choice is between constitutive and non-
constitutive panpsychism. Each choice is fairly independent of the others, so that there
are eight possible versions of panpsychism. Here I will argue that constitutive holistic
panpsychism is the type of panpsychism most relevant to pantheism and thus most
promising in aiding the pantheism in articulating the unity within the universe/God.
7 Philip Goff and Galen Strawson differentiate panpsychism from idealism. Goff defines panpsychism as ‘the
view that fundamental physical entities are conscious’ (Goff 2017a: 283). Strawson writes that panpsychism
means that ‘that the existence of every real concrete thing involves experiential being even if it also involves
non-experiential being’ (Strawson 2006: 8).
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What Is Fundamental?: Atomistic Panpsychism vs. Holistic Panpsychism
To say that a property or entity is fundamental, in this context, is to suggest that it
cannot be explained in terms of, composed of, or derived from anything else.
Panpsychism is distinguished from traditional substance dualism by adopting some
form of monism such that there can be only one fundamental level. This may contain
mind and matter together (dual-aspect or Russellian monism) or just mind (idealism).
Whichever type of monism is proposed, there remain two options for articulating
fundamentality: atomism or holism. Atomistic panpsychism claims that the smallest,
indivisible entities of the universe are what is fundamental, and so it is here that they
posit mentality. Holistic panpsychism claims that the universe, taken as a fundamental
single whole, is mental.
Atomistic panpsychism, which attributes mentality to the most basic, non-composite
subatomic waves and particles of the universe—the building blocks of reality, as it
were—is the default option for most panpsychists. This principle is largely taken as
parallel to the basic intuition and methodology of the natural sciences that microphys-
ical entities combine into macrophysical entities; an engine is made up of parts, parts
are made of up of molecules, molecules are made up of atoms, etc.. Mereological
relationships remain a difficult area for any philosophy, but this appears particularly
tricky in the case of mental parts and wholes.
Panpsychism’s explanatory promise rests upon the idea that human minds can be
explained by fundamental mental entities (the micro-mentality of electrons or quarks,
or the cosmic-mentality of the universe as a whole). However, human self-reflective
experience is of a single unity or self; it is not transparent that human minds are a
collection of selves. Therefore, a principle of either the combination of micro-
phenomena to bring about real unity (and not mere aggregation) or the individuation
of the cosmic-mentality to bring about bounded finite subjectivity lies at the core of the
panpsychist’s thesis.8 Without positing a theory of why some physical compositions
instantiate bounded consciousness and first-person perspective and others do not
panpsychism quickly becomes an absurdity. This is called the Combination Problem.
The most well-known and probably the most difficult version of the combination
problem is the Subject Summing Problem: How does the combination of two distinct
subjects, each with their own bounded first-person perspectives, yield an entirely new
subject? And, what is the new subject’s relation to the original two (or more) combined
subjects? (Chalmers 2017: 182). This is directly related to what Gregg Rosenberg has
termed the Boundary Problem: How is it that micro-experiences combine to yield a
bounded consciousness that, as we saw in the subject-summing problem, appears
isolated and finite? (Rosenberg 1998: 77–90) Although the boundary problem has
received less attention, it may in fact be the hard-nut of these various problems since it
focuses not on what is to be combined but on the boundaries that prevent or enable
combination. Mental combination without boundaries is of no aid to the panpsychist or
the pantheist. This is because without bounded selves the finite individuals, whom both
8 What I call ‘the individuation problem’ has also been referred to as the ‘decombination problem’ by Miri
Albahari (forthcoming), the ‘decomposition problem’ by David Chalmers (Chalmers 2015), and the ‘deriva-
tion problem’ by Yujin Nagasaw and Khai Wager (Nagasawa and Weger 2017). For an excellent treatment of
various types of combination that the atomistic panpsychist needs to account for, see Chalmers (2017: 179–
214). I know of no such equally precise treatment of various individuation problems.
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theories maintain to some degree, would be lost. As Rosenberg writes, ‘in a world
where experiences combined according to a matrix or vector rules, for example, one
might predict an ocean of experience constituting universal consciousness, but not
experiences below that level: a comically cosmic god-mind, experiencing itself alone
forever’ (Rosenberg 2017: 156). From this, we can begin to see how some versions of
panpsychism may dovetail with pantheism.
Chalmers’ exploration of the Subject Summing Problem and Rosenberg’s articula-
tion of the Boundary Problem both approach this challenge from the perspective of
atomistic panpsychism, that is, they both seek an account of mental combination. By
holding that parts are more fundamental than wholes, atomistic panpsychism is a
difficult starting place if one is looking for a way to articulate the primacy of unity
within the universe, as the pantheist is. There has been one proposal to articulate
pantheistic unity through atomistic panpsychism, however. Karl Pfeifer has explicitly
argued that a variety of panpsychism that he calls ‘panintentionalism’ can make
pantheism’s unity claims more intelligible (Pfeifer 2016: 41). Contrary to this paper,
Pfeifer concludes that ‘panpsychism can be tantamount to pantheism’ (Ibid.: 49).
Pfeifer’s first thesis is that the God of pantheism should be understood as a ‘mass
noun’, which can be infinitely divided and combined without losing its essential
identity. The first half of Pfeifer’s chapter concludes by viewing God as the metaphys-
ical substratum of the universe, the stuff which the various objects of the universe are
configurations of (Ibid.: 44). This first thesis seems plausible enough but has little to do
with panpsychism and does nothing to make the God of pantheism a religiously
significant concept, as opposed to merely a semantic term for the stuff of the universe
(see Schopenhauer’s famous quote above). Pfeifer’s second thesis introduces
panpsychism to try and aid pantheism becomes a more compelling position in philos-
ophy of religion. Interestingly, whereas most forms of panpsychism are naturally
aligned with idealistic pantheism, Pfeifer’s builds a thoroughly materialistic pantheism.
The panpsychism in Pfeifer’s presentation can only very charitably referred to a
panprotopsychism, since there is very little talk of ‘psyche’ at any level. Pfeifer’s
panintentionalism is built on the identification of intentional mental states with physical
dispositional states, based on an analogy of the behaviour and capacities of these two
phenomena. Intentional mental states are then described as the summation of lots of
cruder dispositional physical states (Ibid.: 47–48), making this an atomistic approach. It
is hard to discern, in this discussion, if Pfeifer is a realist about consciousness, which is
the backbone of the revival in contemporary panpsychism (Strawson 2006). There is no
discussion of phenomenal consciousness, no talk of experience, or subjects of experi-
ence in this chapter (it is perhaps telling that the philosophers of mind Pfeifer draws
upon for his panintentionalism are not panpsychists, i.e. Daniel Dennett, Fred I. Dretske
and John R. Searle). Without subjects of experience, it is hard to see whose intention-
ality Pfeifer is discussing; it might be God’s since ‘the world [is] God’s brain’, but then
God would not be a mass noun, but a countable subject (Ibid.: 41, 48, 49), and we
would be back to the drawing board on the individuation problem. Pfeifer’s proposal
may be a way to articulate materialistic pantheism, but it does not have a robust account
of mentality to convince this author that panintentionalism is a form of panpsychism,
which is necessary in order to prove the thesis that panpsychism can be tantamount to
pantheism. Nor has Pfeifer successfully accounted of the combination/individuation of
subjects within a cosmic-divine unity, which is the goal of this paper’s exploration.
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The alternative to atomistic panpsychism is holistic panpsychism. Different versions
of holistic panpsychism, such as ‘panexperiential holism’, ‘priority cosmopsychism’
and ‘cosmological panpsychism’, all share the common thesis that the universe as a
single whole is the only fundamental entity, and therefore, it is the universe as a single
whole which instantiates consciousness. This priority of cosmic unity suggests that
holistic panpsychism should be of some interest to the pantheist.
Ludwig Jaskolla and Alexander Buck’s panexperiential holism is a panexperientialist
version of ‘existencemonism’, which states that ‘there is exactly one entity—the universe
itself’ (Jaskolla and Buck 2012: 197). This means that ‘strictly speaking there is only one
real subject—i.e. the big experiential subject of the universe as a whole’ (Ibid:198).
Jaskolla and Buck write that combination ‘is not a problem for panexperiential holism at
all, because there are no [micro] subjects to sum’ (Ibid: 197). Equally, however, Jaskolla
and Buck could say that there are no subjects to individuate, because there are no subjects
except the universe itself as a single subject. It becomes very difficult to locate human
selves or subjects within the framework of existence monism; there is only one true
subject and all other appearances of subjectivity are defined as ‘one particular experiential
pattern [that] the universe undergoes’ (Ibid: 198). Jaskolla and Buck refer to this quasi-
abstract experiential pattern as individual, persisting, human selves (Ibid.). Jaskolla and
Buck do not discuss the first-person perspective that we normally associate with subjects,
and this creates some ambiguity in their paper. Since human selves are not ‘equally real as
the concrete pattern at a particular point in spacetime’, one can assume that human selves
do not have their own first-person perspective. However, as long as human selves remain
the main explanandum of any philosophy of mind, then holistic panexperiential must be
deemed unsatisfactory. Panexperiential holism does not explain human subjectivity; it
merely ignores the question of human subjectivity all together and this is to evade the
core of the problem.
Other forms of holistic panpsychism are more promising. Itay Shani, Philip Goff,
Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager all employ Jonathan Schaeffer’s priority monism
(token monism), which states that the universe exists as a single whole but is not the
only truly existing entity (Schaeffer 2010a, b, 2013). Schaeffer argues that whereas for
aggregates (such as a pile of sand), we intuitively consider the parts prior to the wholes;
for genuine wholes, we intuitively consider the whole more basic (a circle is more basic
than a semi-circle; a body is more basic than a limb). Schaeffer argues that we should
consider the universe as a genuine whole and not an aggregate, more like a circle or
body than an aggregate pile of sand (Schaeffer 2010a: 31, 45–46). Some priority
cosmopsychists employ the metaphor of ‘a vast ocean of consciousness’ in a similar
way to how Schaeffer employs a circle; the ocean can be understood to be a whole
which can be divided, rather than a collection of water molecules (Shani 2015: 389–
437, 411–412.).
Holistic panpsychism and pantheism both state that the universe is fundamentally a
single unified whole and not to be viewed as an aggregate or collection of individual
parts. Priority monism seems to be a suitable model for holistic panpsychists and
pantheists to adopt in seeking to emphasise the primary unity the single cosmic whole,
without denying the reality of things within that whole. Panpsychists use the unity of
consciousness to give articulation of the nature of this cosmic unity; the universe can be
taken as a single whole because it consists in a single consciousness. This seems a very
promising way for pantheism to express the unity within the universe. A pantheist
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would then only need to identify (in a one to one identity relation) this single
consciousness with God.
The move towards holistic panpsychism is often motivated by the desire to retreat
away from such the problems of combination. However, this move runs into the arms
of an equally difficult problem: the Individuation Problem. Although this problem is
often gestured to and widely acknowledged, I know of no precise articulation of the
types of individuation that a holistic panpsychist needs to account for. There are, to my
mind, at least six overlapping types of individuation problems:
How does one consciousness give rise to many distinct subjects, whose experience
and perspective is neither identical to each other, nor to the former single con-
sciousness? (the Subject Individuation Problem)
How does one quality laden field individuate into distinct qualities such that
individual subjects may experience these qualities and not others? (the Quality
Individuation Problem)
How does one experiential field individuate into distinct experiences, such that
individual subjects may enjoy some experiences and not others, and some expe-
riences may be had by one subject but not another subject? (the Experience
Individuation Problem)
How does one experiential or quality laden field individuate into subjects which
have bounded awareness? (the Awareness Individuation Problem)
How does the cosmically structured (we might say sparsely structured), unbound-
ed cosmic consciousness or field of experience structure itself in such a way as to
hold within it distinct (compactly structured) subjects and qualities? (the Structural
Individuation Problem)
Atomistic panpsychists are keen to defend that not all combinations of matter give rise
to new macro-subjects. One of the reasons a theory of combination is so important for
atomistic panpsychism is to avoid the absurd conclusion that every combination of
matter gives rise to a new individual subject. Holistic panpsychism has a similar
problem of over-individuation:
What prevents the continuous individuation of consciousness so that every con-
figuration of matter at every level of reality is a discrete agent? (the Over-
individuation Problem)
Since it seems that my consciousness and experience is not identical to yours, and
since there are many qualities which I believe I have not yet experienced, then I
am justified in believing my own mind to be finite, personal and private. It is a
necessary part of the holistic panpsychist’s task to provide an account for the how
an infinite, universal and public cosmic consciousness takes on these properties of
a single human mind.
Given that, like holistic panpsychism, pantheism takes the unity of the world as
primary, it is panpsychism’s individuation problem which is most pertinent to panthe-
ism. It is not enough to simply claim that the universe is a single whole, there must also
be an explanation for how the reality of my own subjectivity, of which I am most
intimately acquainted and committed to, relates to and might be explained in relation to,
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this cosmic whole. In this way, the pantheist’s problem of unity and the holistic
panpsychist’s problem of individuation are parallel problems.
What Type of Mind?: Subject Panpsychism vs. Panprotopsychism
The second point of variation is the question of how to define mind in its fundamental
form. Panpsychists here form two camps: subject-panpsychists and panprotopsychists
(including panexperientailists and panqualityists). Subject-panpsychists posit minimal
subjects at the fundamental level (micro or cosmic), in that there is something that it is
like to be a fundamental subject of experience (an electron or the universe as a whole).
Subject-panpsychists argue that if it is the first-person perspective of subjects that is
non-emergent and irreducible, then it is the first-person perspective that needs to be
seen as a fundamental property.
However, Sam Coleman has pointed out that it is the claim for fundamental subjects
that gives rise to the sharpest edge of the combination/individuation problem—the
summing of phenomenally unified and bounded macrosubjects from microsubjects
(Coleman 2014: 19–44). Alternatively, panprotopsychism denies that fundamental
mentality includes a micro-subjects or cosmic subjects, such that there is nothing it is
like to be an electron or the universe as a whole. Instead, panprotopsychism suggests
that some other mental property can instantiate phenomenal properties and the first-
person perspective. For example, panexperientialists state that experiences are funda-
mental (without the existence of a subject having that experience), and a panqualityist
claims that unexperienced qualities can collectively constitute a first-person perspective
or fully phenomenal property.
The main advantage of panprotopsychism is that it does not face a subject-summing
problem, since it holds that subjects do not sum but only result from non-subjects
summing. However, the mysterious nature of these proto-phenomenal properties also
means that panprotopsychism offers less explanatory power or competitive appeal over
strong emergence theory or interactive substance dualism. This sacrifice might be
acceptable if panprotopsychism really avoided the combination problem. Unfortunate-
ly, the problem of how subjects are constituted by a combination of non-subjects may
not be any less difficult than the subject panpsychism’s subject-summing problem and
may be no less miraculous than the strong emergence thesis of obtaining subjectivity
from physical properties. Weighing these factors, panprotopsychism seems to have an
intuitive advantage, but explanatory disadvantage, in comparison to subject
panpsychism. It remains up to individual panpsychists to decide which of these factors
is more valuable and this decision has no bearing of the conclusions of this paper. The
more important question for this paper is which of these two alternatives serves
pantheism best.
Pantheists who argue for a personal god are more likely, prima facie, to be attracted to
holistic (subject) panpsychism than to holistic panprotopsychism. Holistic panpsychism
claims that the fundamental consciousness of the universe as a whole has its own first-
person perspective, although it may be of a very different kind to our neurologically
constrained consciousness. Pantheists who argue that the god of pantheism is non-
personal and non-agential are likely to prefer a holistic panprotopsychism, where the
cosmic whole is taken as proto-phenomenal. A pantheistic use of panprotopsychism
would mean that there is nothing that it is like to be the universe/God.
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The question arises if proto-phenomenal properties are a sufficient basis for positing
cosmic unity. On holistic panprotopsychism, the universe would be a single proto-
phenomenal whole: a single experience or a single quality. Although a single phenom-
enal subject, with a single first-person perspective, provides a clearer sense of unity, I
cannot rule out the possibility (although I find it unlikely) that proto-phenomenal
properties are adequate to establish a cosmic unity. Fortunately, this question does
not prevent this article for proceeding, since the decision of whether subject
panpsychism or panprotopsychism is more suited to solving the pantheists unity
problem is determined not by the preference for a personal or impersonal deity but
by the pantheists need for a constitutive unity. As is more fully argued below, a proto-
phenomenal cosmos cannot constitutively instantiate human subjectivity within its
aspects and so if pantheists wish to maintain human subjectivity—even within an
impersonal divine-cosmos, pantheism needs to align itself with subject panpsychism
and not panprotopsychism.
Constitutive Panpsychism vs. Non-constitutive Panpsychism
Is human consciousness constituted by the fundamental mentality, or do our minds hold
some other non-constitutive relation to fundamental mentality? Constitutive
panpsychists argue that ‘macroexperience is (wholly or partially) grounded in
microexperience’ (Chalmers 2017: 25). ‘Grounded in’ is used as equivocal to ‘meta-
physically constituted by’; all true statements about the macro-level are true because of
truths at the micro-level. The relationship between the parts and the whole is synchro-
nous and not a causal relation. On constitutive panpsychism, the macro-level phenom-
ena can be said to be nothing but its micro-level phenomena and their relations. Or
conversely, on constitutive panpsychism, the fundamental level is said to be wholly
sufficient as an explanation for the existence of the human mind. In addition, the
constitutive relation means that the fundamental minds or phenomena continue to exist
and are neither lost nor annihilated by the existence of the macro-mind. This is because
if there were no truths at the micro-level, then they could neither be truths at the macro-
level according to the constitutive relation. This synchronic constitutive relation seems
exactly right for the pantheist model of unity; God is the universe as a whole and
nothing more, and the whole universe is God in such a way that does not annihilate the
subjects (and objects) of the universe. Unfortunately, constitutive panpsychism carries
the full force of the combination/individuation problem, and most of the arguments
against panpsychism over the possibility of combination were more precisely against
constitutive panpsychism.
Non-constitutive panpsychists often seek to deflate the combination/individuation
problem by positing a causal, rather than synchronous combining or individuating,
relation between the fundamental mentality and the human mind. For a non-constitutive
panpsychist, the macro-entity (the human mind) is more than the sum of the micro-
entities and their relations. The main type of non-constitutive relation is the emergence
relation, which claims that a macro-mind (animal or human) is a (strongly) emergent
feature of micro-minds (Brüntrup 2017: 48–71; Rosenberg 2017: 153–175). A sub-type
of emergent panpsychism has been argued for by William Seager in his theory of
panpsychist infusion (Seager 2010: 239). The distinctive feature of the fusion account
of emergent panpsychism is that the fused entities cease to exist as separate entities;
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they sacrifice themselves and their causal powers to the creation of the new emergent
macro-entity.
Non-constitutive relationships between the whole and the parts are unsuited to
holistic panpsychism. An aspect of the universe cannot exceed or be more than the
sum of the universe, since the universe is an exhaustive unity. It is hard to imagine what
it could mean for the contents of the universe to emerge from the universe, since the
universe is not an empty (divine) chamber existing prior to its contents. The contents of
the universe cannot manifest a property which the universe itself also does not manifest
(albeit only in a particular aspect). Since panprotopsychism states that through combi-
nation something more (i.e. subjectivity) comes into being, panprotopsychism seems to
be incompatible with holistic panpsychism. Furthermore, it is logically incoherent to
suggest that the universe can fuse, and therefore cease to exist, for the sake of creating
some aspect within the universe (what would the universe even fuse with?). Non-
constitutive panpsychism, in either emergent panpsychism or combinatorial infusion
forms, does not seem able to be adapted for holistic panpsychism’s individuation
problems.
I have already stated in Section 1 that pantheism requires a constitutive relation of
unity in order to demarcate it from other forms of theist immanence. This point can now
become clearer. If the unity between God and the universe is an emergence based unity,
then the claim might be that God emerges from the universe as new individual or
property. This emergent theism, as put forward by Samuel Alexander is not a version of
pantheism. Alexander’s emergent theism has a clear temporal separation between
emergent deity and the universe, so that God does not permeate the whole universe
but is contained within the space-time continuum as one part (Alexander 1920: 394,
397–8; cf. Thomas 2016). Alternatively, the universe may emerge from God, which
seems close to a theistic or panentheistic model of emanation. In both cases, the
distinction between God and the universe is too strong for a pantheist expression of
unity.
What we can take from the discussion above is that the closest form of panpsychism
to pantheism seems to be a constitutive holistic panpsychism. For a pantheist, it is the
universe as a whole which is given ontological priority and taken as fundamental, as for
holistic panpsychism. For this unity to be sufficiently robust and bare a constitutive
relationship to human subjects, then subject panpsychism (and not panprotopsychism)
is required. Lastly, the relationship between fundamental mentality and human minds
must, for pantheists, be a constitutive relation. The argument so far as shown that
constitutive holistic panpsychism, and not any other type of panpsychism, has the best
chance to aiding pantheists solve their unity problem. If holistic panpsychists can find a
constitutive solution to the individuation problem, then this should give pantheism a
more cogent way of articulating the ‘all-inclusive divine unity’ (Levine 1994: 2).
Section 3: Combination Solutions and Unity Problems
How then do constitutive holistic panpsychists articulate the relationship between the
cosmic consciousness and human consciousness? Are any of the solutions currently on
offer sufficient to articulate the pantheists expression of unity? In this final session I will
address the theories put forward by holistic panpsychists, Itay Shani, Yujin Nagasawa,
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Freya Mathews and Philip Goff. Goff’s is deemed the most promising, despite being
woefully incomplete, but it includes strict constraints upon the nature of the cosmic
(divine) subject which pantheists will most likely reject.
Itay Shani describes the universe as ‘a vast ocean of consciousness’, or an ‘oceanic
plenum... [which] gives rise to various quasi-independent patterns and configurations...some
of these emergent forms...qualify as genuine subjects’ (Shani 2015: 389–437, 411–412).
Human and animal subjects are described using aquatic metaphors as ‘local disturbances
coursing the ocean as currents, waves, streams, eddies, bubbles, ripples, and the
like...vortices of enduring stability, the latter corresponding to the persistent systems and
objects of our ontology’ (Ibid: 414). Human subjects emerge from these structural dynamics
within the universe as ‘the crystallized ego-structure, the self-centred mental occupation of
the individual Bvortex^’ (Ibid: 419). The emergence which Shani talks about is a weak form
of emergence, because he describes it as ‘nothing but dynamic differentiations with the
absolute; all are predicated on an underlying flux from which they emerge, and to which
they ultimately dissolve’ (Ibid: 413). The predication and ‘nothing but’ are the clues that
Shani’s relative subjects (like you and me) are weakly emergent from the whole. This is a
possible theory of constitutive individuation, unlike the non-constitutive strong emergent
panpsychism discussed above. However, weakly emergent entities have no additional causal
powers, which in this case means human experience and action is determined by the
absolute. The threat here is that Shani’s relative subjects are epiphenomenal, submerged
‘in an engulfing oceanic consciousness’ (Ibid: 390).
It is for this reason that, in addition to the weak emergence theory, Shani also
articulates a partial grounding thesis. Partial grounding here means that ‘while [the
human subject] depends on [the absolute subject] it amounts of something more and is
not exhausted by this particular dependency relationship’ (Ibid: 423). Shani wants to
maintain the irreducibility of human subjectivity by describing the human subject-
vortex as ‘an independent entity which neither grounds any other perspective, nor being
grounded by any’ other (Ibid: 423). If human subjectivity is not grounded in the
oceanic consciousness of the universe, where does this ‘independent entity’ come
from? This seems to imply something closer to substance dualism, where the subjec-
tivity at the human level is fundamental and independent and where the first-person
perspective is non-combining and non-individuating. Since weakly emergent subjects
are reducible, this model cannot be combined with independent and irreducible sub-
jects. In his fluctuating between two incompatible and competing models of conscious-
ness—weakly emergent subjects and fundamental independent subjects—Shani fails to
find the middle ground necessary for cosmopsychism to be a viable and demarcated
position of human subjectivity.
Whereas this paper asks the question of whether panpsychists’ answers to the
combination problem hold any profit for pantheism, Yujin Nagasawa’s investigation
moves in the opposition direction from philosophy of religion to philosophy of mind.
He argues by analogy that because polytheism and pantheism are compatible positions
within philosophy of religion, the many animal subjects are compatible within a single
cosmic subject within philosophy of mind (Nagasawa forthcoming). Although this may
be the case, it does not seem to offer any explanatory relief for my concerns for
individuation, since we can know very little about the relationship between polytheistic
gods and a pantheistic God. Nagasawa offers no further explanation for why polythe-
ism and pantheism are compatible and so sheds no further light on how the analogy to
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divinity aids in the question of how private individual minds, as we experience them,
individuate from a single cosmic mind.
Beyond the comparison with philosophy of religion, Nagasawa gives two more
metaphors for how to understand the relationship between the one and many for
cosmopsychism. He suggests we think of the cosmic consciousness like a perfectly
and infinitely smooth painting, which since perfectly and infinitely smooth is not made
up of many atomistic dots (Nagasawa forthcoming; Nagasawa and Weger 2017: 122).
Within this one smooth homogeneous painting, there can be an equally smooth
segment of the painting or the original painting may be a segment of an even larger
perfectly smooth homogeneous painting. Nagasawa suggests that this might be analo-
gous to the relationship between the larger consciousness of the cosmos and the
consciousness instantiated by the brain. This analogy does nothing to alleviate my
concerns regarding the Over-individuation Problem. This is because if a segment of a
painting is more than a portion which the hypothetical viewer chooses to draw an
imaginary line around, then the painting is not perfectly smooth and homogenous. If the
painting is truly perfectly smooth and homogeneous, then the segment cannot be
objectively differentiated or individuated from the larger whole.
Nagasawa’s second analogy is to a visual experience which can be considered a
unity and segmented into distinguishable colour experience (Nagasawa and Weger
2017: 121–122). Developing this line of thinking may answer the Quality Individuation
Problem and the Experience Individuation Problem as I have outlined them above.
However, since this analogy is about segments of one experience and regional qualities
within one subject/perspective, with no further subjects/perspectives being proposed, it
goes no way towards answering the Subject Individuation Problem. Nagasawa’s
proposal cannot yet, to my mind, fully defend the claim that ‘it seems reasonable to
think that cosmopsychism can answer the derivation problem’ when this is applied to
the derivation of bounded subjects (Nagasawa forthcoming).
Freya Mathews’ work is a significant attempt to ‘enter the terrain of Bspirituality^’
through ‘cosmological panpsychism’ (Mathews 2011: 141). Mathews speaks of the
human relationship to the world as ‘kneeling tenderly at its feet, awaiting its command,
trying to divine its will. From this point of view the world is our sovereign, our solace,
our beloved, and we are its people’ (Mathews 2003: 1). The relationship between the
one (the cosmic self) and the many (all relative selves such as humans and ecosystems)
is an erotic and mutually self-realizing communication (Ibid: 10). Mathews’ construc-
tion of a spiritual panpsychism is in line with many ideas within pantheism.
Since her spirituality of erotic communication is based on the presupposition of
individuated relative subjects within the cosmic subject, Mathews sees the importance
of individuation for holistic panpsychism. Mathews articulates that ‘The question, from
this point of view, is … how it is that a particular part of the continuum can come to
experience itself as a relatively distinct and individual subject, or center of awareness’
(Ibid: 38). She affirms that there is ‘no such thing as free-floating subjectivity—
subjectivity that does not belong to a particular subject’ (Ibid: 46). This means that
there is no substance called ‘subjectivity’ which is organized into centred subjects, but
that the One subject must differentiate itself into many centres of subjectivity. However,
she also affirms that a subject is ‘necessarily an indivisible unity: there are no Bscattered
subjects^’, even in the case of the one differentiated cosmic subject (Ibid: 46). Finally,
she states that ‘the boundaries between even only relatively individuated subjects are
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not nominal’. (Ibid: 46) This is in contrast to the individuation of matter which has a
‘purely nominal status’ (Ibid: 47). She acknowledges a ‘tension’ in her proposal
between ‘relative individuation. [of subjects] … with their relative dissociation from
the whole’ and the indivisibility of the whole (Ibid: 40). The question remains if the
boundaries between subjects are objectively real and subjects are indivisible unities,
then how can many relative subjects, with their own first-person perspectives, exist
within another without the whole subject being a scattered subject? How is the unity of
the cosmic subject maintained?
Mathews’ solution to the individuation problem is expressed through systems theory.
She defines a self as a ‘self-realizing system … [which is] defined in systems-
theoretical terms, as a system with a very special kind of goal, namely its own
maintenance and self-perpetuation’ (Mathews 2003: 48). A relative self is individuated
by becoming self-reflexive which occurs ‘wherever the primal field assumes the
configurations characteristic of self-realizing systems’ (Ibid: 50). Mathews grounds
subject individuation in biological individuation, despite having said that biological
individuation is nominal (existing by name only from the perspective of knowing/
naming subject), whereas subject individuation is not. There is a risk that to speak of
‘self-realizing systems’ presupposes, a self around which the system is organized,
rather than a self which arises out of the behaviour of the system.
Mathews concludes that ‘Individuation will not, in the case of such systems [which
is in the case of every subject Mathews posits], be precise, and questions of demarca-
tion will certainly arise’ (Ibid: 51). However, without clear demarcation, what does it
mean to assert that subjects are objectively bounded indivisible unities? Without
demarcation, there can be no genuine communication between different selves, and
communication constitutes the flourishing of the many and the self-realization of the
one. Mathews’ larger project rests on the presupposition of individuation, but her
biological systems-based account does not go far enough, in my mind, to securing
and articulating a theory of subject and perspective individuation.
The final possible solution is Philip Goff’s theory of ‘grounding by subsumption’.
This is a solution which, although underdeveloped, might be suitable for the pantheist.
Grounding by subsumption is defined as:
Entity X grounds by subsumption entity in Y iff (i) X grounds Y, (ii) X is a unity
of which Y is an aspect. (Goff 2017b: 224)
On this view, finite minds, such as human minds, are aspects of the one unified cosmic
mind. Finite minds are grounded in the more expansive infinite unity, because as with
normal grounding relations, all true statements at the finite (human) level are true
because of facts at the cosmic level. The weakness of this solution is that it is ultimately
mysterious—‘knee deep in noumenalism’ (Ibid: 234–35) as Goff writes.9 From a
panpsychist’s perspective, it is unclear if Goff’s noumenalism is any better than strong
emergentists’ or the mystery of combination within atomistic panpsychism. However,
since the pantheist is not so much looking for an exhaustive explanation of God as a
9 From a panpsychists perspective, if this is Goff’s final conclusion then for the sake of parsimony perhaps
Colin McGinn’s hypothesis should be accepted without the bother of articulating a cosmic consciousness
about which we can know nothing (McGinn 1989).
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credible articulation, this may not be so severe a problem. Goff is clear that this
proposal only works for holistic subject panpsychism and so would be unsuited to
impersonal, non-agential and non-subject based versions of pantheism. It is this
component of Goff’s proposal which may be problematic for the pantheist.
Goff’s solution only applies to subject panpsychism because, as a constitutive
relation, grounding by subsumption entails that, ‘the nature of an aspect that it is
nothing over and above the unity of which it is an aspect’ (Ibid: 229). The aspects
(human minds) cannot have properties or capacities over and above the cosmic mind.10
Since all the finite subjects are subsumed within and constituted by the cosmic subject,
the cosmic subject would have to be aware of all the experiences and perspectives of
the multitude of finite subjects. This could be a theory of omniscience for the cosmic
subject. However, the cosmic subject would not only know about each first-perspec-
tive, but it would also experience them all as its own first-person perspective. Since the
cosmic subject is nothing over and above the finite subjects, it would not be able to
harmonize or adjudicate between contrary beliefs or experiences. A holistic panpsychist
should not claim that the many first-person perspectives combine into one cosmic
consciousness, since this only places the atomistic panpsychists combination problem
on a cosmic scale but needs to hold that the cosmic consciousness is a unity of non-
harmonized subjectivities. Goff writes, ‘Cosmopsychism does not entail pantheism. We
need not think of the universe as a supremely intelligent rational agent.... It is more
plausible to think that the consciousness of the universe is simply a mess’ (Ibid: 246).
In so far as pantheism seeks to offer a religious alternative to theism, Goff is wrong to
imply that pantheism entails the belief in a ‘supremely intelligent rational agent’, but it
does entail a unified deity worthy of worship, adoration and capable to giving religious
meaning to human lives. Is Goff’s cosmic subject a suitable candidate for not only
philosophy of mind, but also philosophy of religion?
Goff’s grounding by subsumption solution sets fairly strict guidelines for the nature
of the God/universe, which determine its religious significance in specific ways. As
stated above, the pantheist God may be said to be omniscient in this specific sense,
which includes confusion and incoherence. A pantheist God, inspired by Goff’s
panpsychism, may also be said to be omnipotent in a qualified sense. Holistic
panpsychism implies that ‘the actions of [ordinary] o-subjects as aspects of—and hence
are nothing over and above—the ‘actions’ of the universe.... the causal powers of the
universe result in its changing itself from moment to moment’ (Ibid: 250). Thus,
everything that happens in the universe could not have happened otherwise
(determinism) and occurred due to the movement of the universe as a whole and
cannot be ultimately attributed to the movements to localised or individual aspects of
the universe, i.e. no libertarian free will (Ibid: 257).11 To this extent, the pantheist may
express gratitude or lament towards cosmic whole for all the events in one’s life, in
addition to one’s own existence (although, of course, this expression of gratitude is
10 Goff writes: ‘Panprotopsychist subject-subsumption does not seem to me to be coherent, at least once we
accept that conscious subjects are irreducible... for an entity E to have a unified nature to incorporate M [a
conscious mind] within itself. And surely E cannot incorporate a conscious mind within its nature without
itself being conscious’ (Goff 2017a, 2017b: 234).
11 A careful discussion of regarding compatibalist notions of freedom within form of pantheism is necessary
here and may provide the pantheistic a way to employing Goff’s model without suffering this consequence but
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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determined also and so might be viewed as the self-congratulation of the cosmic self).
That said, given the ‘messy’ nature of the cosmic consciousness, it is difficult to view
this movement as in any way planned or purposeful. Indeed, for the cosmic self to have
intentions of its own would be for it to exist over and above, rather than in unity with,
the animal and human subjectivities of the universe. This is clearly a very different
sense of omnipotence to what is meant by the monotheistic world religions or theistic
belief in a transcendent personal creator, which may not be a problem for the pantheist
of course.
More seriously for many pantheists, the determinism herein may provide some
challenges to the ethical imperative towards care for the Earth, ecosystem, and universe
as a whole which pantheism is often associated with and motivated by. In fact, the
destruction of the Earth would not be the fault of human beings (since humans do not
ultimately cause anything), on this model. Instead, ecological destruction would be the
result of the universe’s/God’s action towards this specific internal region we call Earth.
On this view, suffering and destruction could only be explained as the confused cosmic
God harming parts of itself. This implication alone may cause some pantheists to reject
Goff’s ‘cosmopsychism’ as a suitable expression of the pantheistic unity. However, in
this case, the pantheist will need to look elsewhere than panpsychism to aid in
articulating the nature of this unity.
Section 4: Conclusions
For panpsychism to maintain a competitive, explanatory edge over and against com-
peting philosophies of mind, and for pantheism to offer a clear articulation of the God/
universe unity distinguishable from other forms of religious belief, both theories require
an account of how smaller subjects can form parts of larger subjects (combination) or
how larger subjects contain smaller subjects within themselves (individuation). Al-
though not identical problems, the first half of this paper showed the parallel nature of
the pantheists’ problem of unity and the panpsychists’ problem of combination/
individuation.
Holistic panpsychism and pantheism share a common problem, how to articulate a
constitutive relation between individual human subjects and a larger cosmic whole; but
can they share a common solution? If translated into panpsychist typologies, then
pantheism seeks a constitutive relation of individuation between God/the universe
and the contents of the universe (in particular, human subjects). After surveying various
attempts by panpsychists (Shani, Nagasawa, Mathews and Goff) to articulate this
relation, this paper found that Goff’s grounding by subsumption appears the most
promising, but is significantly underdeveloped. However, it will be up to contemporary
pantheists to decide whether the religious entailments of this position disqualify it from
warranting further development. I suspect many pantheists will find Goff’s position a
bitter pill to swallow.
This paper sought to explore the dialogue and potential compatibility between
panpsychism and pantheism. The first implication from this paper is that there are far
more types of panpsychism incompatible to pantheism than there are compatible with
it. This points to a tension within the relationship between panpsychism and pantheism
which has so far not be appreciated and should be of concern to those who seek to unify
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these two philosophies. A secondary implication for further research, as it would
require another paper to be explored fully, is that other positions within philosophy
of religion (theism, panentheism, polytheism, etc.) may find dialogue with various
forms of panpsychism easier and more profitable than previously imagined.
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